Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 01b736d5cb3f6a03…

MALICIOUS

PDF

31.8 KB Created: 2020-06-12 06:12:46 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 6a58e21dfdbd86e34fa54e9c92c19f25 SHA-1: ce53ad30aa596a2d91bfa944f81751c323fd2ea1 SHA-256: 01b736d5cb3f6a030f9ba0410221667cca07aaa7d028f3e86a28af7633cb7b8a
136 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF document is identified as malicious by an ML classifier and contains numerous external links, suggesting it's part of a link farm designed to distribute malware. The 'SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE' heuristic indicates the document likely instructs the user to download a password-protected archive, a common tactic to bypass security scans. The embedded URLs point to potentially malicious content, with the primary lure being a 'Vtech telezapper manual'.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 5

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://dexterjones.co/uploads/1/3/0/3/130323155/130323155.html#vtech+telezapper+manual
    • http://edmsm.com/uploads/1/3/0/2/130287938/efa339.pdf
    • http://vent-cleaning-atlanta.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131872054/2989289.pdf
    • http://shopbimbe.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380354/3fe728d.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://jekokugin.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/48549647281.pdf
    • https://fusosimube.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/warexabapinonuwad.pdf
    • https://wujixose.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/74141293960.pdf
    • https://jadulotixen.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/kupafevoruvotagix.pdf
    • https://tigizenawa.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/78897786652.pdf
    • https://siguzewikof.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/nagepurelo.pdf
    • https://zezisid.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/kigitaw.pdf
    • https://modanafo.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/73860718767.pdf
    • https://kagopufep.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/ziwimereluwavepivifapegu.pdf
    • https://pigumofow.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/pinuxevabixevo.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000524a.bin
1f4398ca00e363173d7315de1d5b07913120c38dc1ab3c666cb2b04237235509		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x524A 9932 bytes

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