Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 019eefe4f3999db0…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

168.0 KB Created: 2001-12-14 14:26:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word 9.0
MD5: 0fdfcb858a2e44611ce79511eabed73e SHA-1: 3c15a79b6f3ac11a72483828e950f71af4ec46ed SHA-256: 019eefe4f3999db0b9fdffde26b7fc093df95728a6007e77ec453397324ee27f
320 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The sample is a Microsoft Word document that exploits CVE-2006-6456, a vulnerability related to malformed tables. Heuristics indicate the use of WinExec, CreateProcess, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress APIs, along with suspicious cmd.exe invocation, suggesting the execution of a secondary payload. The large slack space in the OLE structure is also anomalous.

Heuristics 8

  • CVE-2006-6456 — Microsoft Word malformed table SPRM critical CVE exact CVE_2006_6456
    WordDocument contains a malformed table border-color SPRM in the CVE-2006-6456 shape: a valid table-SPRM cluster is followed by an invalid high-byte 0xFF SPRM where Word expects a normal sprmTBrc*Cv record. Vulnerable Word 2000/2002/2003 parsers corrupt memory while handling this malformed data structure.
  • Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXEC
    Reference to WinExec API
  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD
    Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 172,032 bytes but its declared streams total only 94,801 bytes — 77,231 bytes (45%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API

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