Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0187fc0bc8addf4a…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.8 KB
MD5: afb651b6577eb5a0b605f1cf56e807cc SHA-1: 102cd8cc2da158ce562287af707c1da088e92025 SHA-256: 0187fc0bc8addf4a9dcaf818471743ff9f75d531d341863c74af74f95b3c29f0
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). This indicates the file is designed to exploit this known vulnerability for initial code execution. No scripts were extracted, and the document body contained only numerical data, providing no further context on the payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000e9.bin
c2839b7beb76f27c6e5422ab271adb0248d95447494770b993ae37ae95753dab		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xE9 2156 bytes

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