Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 016d1da2f0244ac3…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

35.5 KB First seen: 2023-03-27
MD5: c5f03dfe714e81188bc7c6a681b48147 SHA-1: 3fa716a9f1781eb63de8987d0a176c840643c3f9 SHA-256: 016d1da2f0244ac3bbc392caace0d8ff5fd1870e6c627802d2e8b09c39e393a3
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, a known exploit technique. The document also contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', indicating it's designed to trick users into activating the exploit. The exploit likely leads to the execution of a secondary payload, though no specific script or payload details were extracted.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00005827.bin
af3229ac93330756c5a563f13c545f6de6ff00a425e75a0c391afc98fd351474
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x5827 1828 bytes