Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 016611697885e9b9…

MALICIOUS

PDF

82.0 KB Created: 2021-06-27 23:01:43 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 12198ca989e324bb83efdbe5cfabe994 SHA-1: 2894b82bcd9213d1b61f7210011b19d82afc4fc5 SHA-256: 016611697885e9b93ea1baf327161ca35d337a930f6cc8c26a6e4e2e6fb19402
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file exhibits multiple indicators of malicious intent, including a high number of links to compromised CMS uploads and disposable hosting, suggesting it's part of a link farm designed to redirect users. The presence of a 'download button' lure and the ML classifier's high confidence score further support its malicious nature. The ClamAV detection as 'Pdf.Phishing.Trojan' strongly indicates it's a phishing or trojan delivery mechanism, likely leading to a second-stage payload download.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9960

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://irlanc.ru/uplcv?utm_term=present+simple+question+words
    • https://www.baileysmilk.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7ebe3906c047206bcc4cb78bc5352a31/mijazo.pdf
    • http://developmentassociationofnagaland.org/nbloom/fckuploads/file/fabiwaxisiw.pdf
    • http://slsnn.ru/content/file/5111669803.pdf
    • http://bamt.be/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160712705b9951---68876431010.pdf
    • https://1sis.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609eb7ef9698c---96716573003.pdf
    • http://www.gametimecatering.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a1a6092d9da---dafoxa.pdf
    • http://diakmelo.hu/ckfinder/userfiles/files/lupoxitupo.pdf
    • http://indiebookoftheday.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160893aead6cfc---kifewamuxokol.pdf
    • https://snabavto.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c51f37d77c5---silif.pdf
    • https://allianceflooring.net/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0458d059e096e4537a8e45155d3efd9e/43328737482.pdf
    • https://www.inter-tube.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/456332472bad20d15c750d6435236a57/pakosemuzuraxigodu.pdf
    • https://apexforestservices.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160837fa18fe71---84468811965.pdf
    • https://www.pennlighting.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a5c1f4682914d9e4d95ab2815dad11ef/biwawejezugujulobuwidokad.pdf
    • http://www.grundys.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16080929c30bae---xoxoxixepagefolavuviduwi.pdf
    • https://ag-concept.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/05315c4cffa0393d55437db18558f994/dikemusemel.pdf
    • https://kumsalgame.com/calisma2/files/uploads/64666265169.pdf
    • https://goooinggroup.com/userfiles/files/20210622_153108.pdf
    • http://mas.vacations/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608ca12c407b1---67135662437.pdf
    • http://aliceinformaticasrl.com/user/pages/94690560956.pdf
    • http://www.britocunhaadvocacia.com.br/home/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16082838bf1b4f---roxanikivipeposina.pdf
    • http://sushibelovo.ru/files/95643582613.pdf
    • http://paintingservicesonline.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b75b570241b---88595371788.pdf
    • http://www.rkcomdesignservices.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160794f398902e---39724149302.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dc79.bin
9eae0c4433128772a5f57373fc2e5d16ed28a08357b48a7d5f7256afbc38d7d8		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDC79 17088 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000108e0.bin
26e3c36e45910d110958dda142d1f3e957f9d5ec4bedf9ae113142af9dc26e45		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x108E0 10724 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00012150.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12150 16792 bytes

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