Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0165f6f4ceb4aa22…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

676.0 KB
MD5: f0b3b05e956b9ea6d95a7a198560742a SHA-1: b985ca8cb0b04621fe74d1be85f7f3518ec115f0 SHA-256: 0165f6f4ceb4aa22be853e78737e59f7ba54aa9481c3a56e7592d1e672020b90
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The sample is an encrypted Office document, a common delivery mechanism for exploits. Heuristics indicate the presence of an Equation Editor OLE object, which is frequently exploited to deliver malicious payloads. The encryption and the specific OLE object suggest an attempt to hide malicious content and leverage a known vulnerability.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007+, AES-128)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.