Emooodldr — Office (OOXML) / .DOCM malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 015a96c0567c86af…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCM

140.5 KB Created: 2021-11-15 15:39:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 12.0000
MD5: b6e9028801480b692e04a6297f4e3cfc SHA-1: cc580347d3ae68dbe05438dde997915e31201607 SHA-256: 015a96c0567c86af8c15b3fe4e19098ae9d0ea583e6bc0bb71c344fc993a26cf
304 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emooodldr · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is a DOCM file containing a Document_Open macro, which is a common technique for initial execution. The macro utilizes `CreateObject` and `GetObject` functions, indicative of downloading and executing a secondary payload. ClamAV signatures confirm the family as Emooodldr, a known downloader.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Xls.Downloader.Emooodldr-10031562-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Downloader.Emooodldr-10031562-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
e53e3734f5c43adf58370feee1b5707cc66f4a1c2cd43a48deedecacf5c12b3d		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 4433 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
vbaProject_00.bin
0495b007d3527ce37932e4e17ed7bb58041ebf1089c19fe0fe1bae73de55b90d		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 16896 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Xls.Downloader.Emooodldr-10031562-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

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