Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 014a4bbc33f081eb…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOCX

35.0 KB Created: 2021-09-20 23:02:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 57ec62fbaf92b49694bdbea58e0bb317 SHA-1: a36a89f5d33973a473319c52d2ea1b8a6e8d0761 SHA-256: 014a4bbc33f081eb71515fb72d46358ea6359a2346cacd3ab86cf596ede701f3
370 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a VBA macro with an AutoOpen function that is heavily obfuscated. The macro attempts to download a file from the provided Discord CDN URL, save it as 'word.file' in the public directory, and then execute it using 'rundll32'. This indicates a downloader or dropper functionality, aiming to fetch and run a secondary payload.

Heuristics 10

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • cmd.exe reference in VBA high OLE_VBA_CMD
    cmd.exe reference in VBA
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/873792563868479538/890215024143003708/google.net
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
9bee28e61bc9600769a22fe7c3538d41163298dbfa984b427799b682142b0d53
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 3106 bytes