Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0143cd3aaaca405c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

84.7 KB Created: 2021-07-17 22:09:23 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-09-14
MD5: 30170fbe3c56e5c5a368f2117015130a SHA-1: ecce8a3e1d632b663b1f7ee73ebd0fff97e5a7a2 SHA-256: 0143cd3aaaca405cc38509f12e638b7b232c74e6ea4cef81895ac4f88d36d93e
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

This PDF file was flagged by multiple heuristics as malicious, including a high-confidence ML classifier and ClamAV detection. The heuristics indicate it functions as a link farm, directing users to potentially compromised websites, and employs social engineering tactics like a "download button" lure and a "browser install lure" to trick users into downloading further malicious content. The presence of numerous unknown URLs associated with compromised CMS uploads and disposable hosting further supports its malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9964

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://dlshixiang.com.cn/ckfinder/userfiles/files/zogumopaxarasaferemazazu.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://youstore21.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/50a2de63d83713e75d9b6ab73cb26389/xekij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://giorgiosantinelli.it/file/xavubokepa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://monkey-do.net/userfiles/file/11724882616.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://noihoithanhtuan.com/media/ftp/file/80888512079.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://eliteplacementagency.com/uploads/files/lobufimof.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://efficimm.fr/userfiles/files/nomoxudeguf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.1000ena.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ae8ab73134c---53024007219.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://1sis.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a40ac6335ae---82405675514.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://benchmarktransitions.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b610506a227---93240321704.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://phantasos.org/userfiles/file/vatavofutibof.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://delawaretravelmedicine.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606d820d24a41---99463330934.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ontheedgeofnow.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b74c7a4dd55---zomabeledepotamotiwu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://humantouchtranslations.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1/160c02425af4ba---97313052193.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://qboardapp.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/97675b81480adc2701d96342150d1f04/gorevevekumogusudov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://indianpowerliftingfederation.com/userfiles/file/mumonefe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bluiettgriffinwilliams.org/clients/2/2a/2accc941c041fffeac9751862bb8fe41/File/tegasesu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xn--12cmi2byac9cdhd0hra6d7bxkwbgj1gch.com/user_img/files/niralimugofugej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.kalirich.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/opagou2ks8efjnpk96lbjhkkk5/16517779507.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://erdbau-rauch.at/82198406511.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://trucraftsmanship.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607019499d992---merubiruxadefexuzi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.garriagricola.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608a1e66450b1---saxufupudaroduwakepogida.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/fzgW7-mxBc0/uplcv?utm_term=download+windows+7+update+manuallyPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e83b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE83B 16892 bytes
SHA-256: 70f7d85139406230f596a128cb7040e85877128aba26a4d3009da2f72c1a96a9
font_01_sfnt_off0001144f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1144F 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off00012c66.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12C66 10804 bytes
SHA-256: cba891dece9ab999f233b6029db4723815338387037a3da09ad439e5a4205137

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