Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 013a636f0da9f67e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.4 KB Created: 2021-02-21 10:53:30 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: 6ef159a961c94b57963d65ba1634e6de SHA-1: 99727cb4c05a1773d0ae8a5a6439b6d6a0c41442 SHA-256: 013a636f0da9f67ef830c10d25b9bdb3cfec16616d053a8ba28bdfae7f71c1ed
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains multiple embedded URLs, with several pointing to known malicious redirectors and disposable hosting. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware distribution. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded links are indicative of a redirection chain designed to lead the user to a malicious site.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://yafferge.ru/wb?keyword=a%20village%20girl%20poem%20analysis%20by%20mohan%20singh In PDF document text
    • http://davilebut.66ghz.com/itlu_anjali_movie_songs.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nukevokisoget.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132711970/sagez_gadopunuwibep_lujas_nelab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tumexade.22web.org/ba_1st_year_book_in_kannada.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fipoziwebetaz.22web.org/wetixaz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/kuwusetoteji/cgjjdhf/sky_force_reloaded_game_apk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wafewukim.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135399971/vanokusuno_bijifu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/tenokesime/QPidCGA/pefar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://piwudev.iblogger.org/brightburn_movie_in_tamil_isaimini.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mamowolo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134714390/xuvatedu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tefakunuti.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871494/femogiwu_bukopetopud_vofedupunan_kilegegosexe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/letijefa/d3rQOTv/rosuzemuw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jenogisemelo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132303080/lulawulogozejuregide.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/faduxodiwo/namo_bhutanatha_kannada_song.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kozifina.epizy.com/calgary_bike_path_map.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wovigebi/72519954038.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zanebinelit.rf.gd/character_and_antecedent_certificate_for_ssb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kemuvatixas.epizy.com/61617723138.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ee28.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEE28 5524 bytes
SHA-256: 222363a896a806728b0da44dd9f835da563ca157bac1a58c3a9941bacf356108
font_01_sfnt_off000100d2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x100D2 10364 bytes
SHA-256: 95908dbab45b8194ede3ac299f7537cb12be922ebc4f66733d7eab4c5eda3502

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