Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0131352357d8bf94…

MALICIOUS

PDF

12.0 KB Created: 2009-12-17 19:41:26 Authoring application: PDF Library 1.4.2 (via PDF Library 5.6.3)
MD5: 1d77914ecb3b2edb53237a9f08fe3105 SHA-1: 4f1468bb23e3db84fb6aa864de99672baea738ab SHA-256: 0131352357d8bf948293d7f2b39aac85052d0de3f42a39b1cb0d13859357bcdb
470 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 JavaScript T1204 User Execution

The PDF exploits multiple CVEs related to Adobe Reader JavaScript execution, specifically targeting Collab.getIcon, Collab.collectEmailInfo, and util.printf. The embedded JavaScript, after deobfuscation, contains shellcode that downloads a second-stage executable from the provided URLs. This indicates a downloader or exploit kit functionality.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • PDF JavaScript shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF JavaScript shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • ASCIIHexDecode filter (with exploit indicators) medium PDF_FILTER_HEX
    Hex-encoding filter present alongside exploit delivery indicators — often used to hide payload or shellcode bytes
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://msnssd.com/vvv/abmqy2.exe
    • http://msnssd.com/vvv/click.php?r=
    • http://msnssd.com/vvv/gjnu2.exe
    • http://msnssd.com/vvv/ghtv2.exe

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0007_000.js
ec3c353e0b52538c131a2cd2e8b77feb2c9fd15bad0793739f3da1210b64d471		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 7 at offset 0x268 37564 bytes
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js
c33b905c3ee004832113fa6384c135ef176881a2a56ef406d4d3bdbcf3b3e9ec		 deobfuscated-js numeric array subtract-key decoded JavaScript at offset 0x268 9868 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Js.Exploit.Shellcode-18
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 9 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

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