Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0121b47cf5dcbb67…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

127.0 KB Created: 2017-11-06 15:13:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2017-11-13
MD5: 30c6f649b0b02bc01d117cef3532100d SHA-1: edd91613da7a37670664c31ff01db28e3c8ab299 SHA-256: 0121b47cf5dcbb67be681649da5019d621023aa1ec967be6b12292369a726bea
224 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample contains an embedded OLE object with indicators of a payload or link, specifically identified as a potential CVE-2026-21514 exploitation shape. This object contains a URL, http://xn--buremrt-9wa.ch/12, which is likely used to download and execute a second-stage payload. ClamAV detections further confirm the malicious nature, identifying it as an Img.Dropper.PhishingLure and noting suspicious PowerShell activity in an extracted artifact.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Img.Dropper.PhishingLure-6362648-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Img.Dropper.PhishingLure-6362648-0
  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Payload URL recovered from embedded OLE object (1 URL) info OOXML_EMBEDDED_OBJECT_URL
    An embedded OLE object (xl/word/ppt embeddings) carries a next-stage download URL in its Ole10Native/Package stream — stored literally (incl. UTF-16) or base64-encoded — which the package-level URL sweep does not see. Surfaced as an IOC; self-validating (only real payload hosts).
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://xn--buremrt-9wa.ch/12 In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvasIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 4608 bytes
SHA-256: 82704da7754826306037277bdc4968f7394abd70866be9657a3dfeaed2d91aea
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Dropper.Powershell-6368805-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): powershell.exe, PowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 2367 bytes
SHA-256: 024161396b8e02821eb1e1b37cbbdc2af00d1dfaf279340de36feb7f17fefbac
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): powershell.exe, PowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
emf_00.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5424 bytes
SHA-256: 5723e14ee216a46f28582d5d60db5599c7142567b9f6892decf1babbe1f94dce

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