Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 00f967ff0acffc54…

MALICIOUS

PDF

801 B
MD5: f05eb6a1aaafb68766d8f7b8633cb416 SHA-1: 691d216b52b86e2b1dd3798baf4c2d56e9c0d117 SHA-256: 00f967ff0acffc54a34a651a70ae8e78e99839f0ee967e73222afbe7c2adca41
212 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious File Execution T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

The PDF file contains a launch action that executes a command to download and run a VBScript from the URL http://itditd.co.cc/capt/tmp/m.vbs. The embedded script itself is truncated but appears to be part of a dropper mechanism, attempting to create and execute a file named 'm.vbs'. This indicates a multi-stage attack designed to deliver a malicious payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • Adobe Reader Launch action VBS dropper command chain critical CVE likely CVE_2010_1240_LAUNCH_VBS_DROPPER
    PDF uses a CVE-2010-1240-style Launch action: cmd.exe is invoked from /Launch and builds a VBS stage that uses ADODB.Stream, MSXML2.XMLHTTP, or FileSystemObject to write or execute a payload.
  • Launch action high PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action with an unresolved or extension-less target — treat as potentially dangerous
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • /Launch action target: cmd high PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/c echo B="m.vbs":With CreateObject(StrReverse("PTTHLMX.2LMXSM"'.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://itditd.co.cc/capt/tmp/m.vbs

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_0000006f.bin
ad55c8e83a5896a04b2012c676820daeab2b84cc539e444c6366e79f55a571c5
pdf-embedded-script PDF decompressed stream script payload at offset 0x6F 63 bytes