Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 00f5646eb244208f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.3 KB Created: 2021-03-09 00:10:09 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-18
MD5: 670df68159a0859001be02d094a06715 SHA-1: 6f9cbf1c6de2139e236e655a08764f3c8a7e1ebe SHA-256: 00f5646eb244208fe12bfbc6f007459b67adda0215e388a0e8723be8b809288f
166 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains an embedded script and multiple URLs, some of which are associated with PowerShell commands. The heuristic 'SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND' specifically mentions 'powershell' followed by several URLs, indicating an attempt to execute a PowerShell command to download a payload. The embedded script itself contains metadata related to 'Text file to html powershell', reinforcing the attack vector. The presence of an embedded script and the nature of the URLs suggest this is a malicious document likely delivered as a spearphishing attachment.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9992

Heuristics 7

  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://botokaw.ru/strik?utm_term=text+file+to+html+powershell PDF link annotation
    • http://woziwowariv.sportsontheweb.net/46619202298.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://hookup673.site/ejemplos_de_velocidad_instantnea_oxn67j.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4381104/normal_5ffd0098199cf.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4485942/normal_601aacd2f0222.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4403537/normal_60341c8d6a785.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365601/normal_602a97d4ac185.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://small-italy.space/nordictrack_exp1000i_reviewlimcu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4444877/normal_60469fcea459b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366316/normal_600bb4f25fad5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4391920/normal_5fe67861c45eb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gidujoluj.mypressonline.com/working_capital_management_policy.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://airet.space/makexuvanipere2h5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://allfreebets.ru/fifty_shades_of_grey_movies_counter_dual_audioo2z6c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rasudilikid.mywebcommunity.org/domozojabukugemukakebivo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://famojefefe.iblogger.org/52382889.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f754dab0-9d3d-4e8c-9a3d-c9f9fabe07aa/bissell_turboclean_powerbrush_pet_carpet_cleaner_2085_how_to_use.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tevezizexuvifuj.epizy.com/21163007120.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vizepojuduw.rf.gd/android_appcompatactivity_toolbar_example.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vebusatoro.atwebpages.com/guardian_ad_litem_wisconsin_cost.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f9b5ebf2-3cb3-4282-ab61-0ff6be826ec3/jurojeke.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4dcc1b09-4c77-4249-b4bc-c167479e3e37/29509286780.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rozibata.epizy.com/vinudeguv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://livirava.atwebpages.com/xisovopowedatet.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_00012beb.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x12BEB 1614 bytes
SHA-256: 981a5553371f68fd919484d6a335bc98b8aa8e7f2a04216b426589413c1d92af
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='Solid Converter PDF'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Nucexafa Wigenuju</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Text file to html powershell. October 9, 2012 Posted by newlife007 on Oct 9, 2012 in Powershell | 13 comments Recently, I was task</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Text file to html powershell. October 9, 2012 Posted by newlife007 on Oct 9, 2012 in Powershell | 13 comments Recently, I was task</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Text file to html powershell</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='Solid Converter PDF'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-10-01T12:59:15'
  xmp:CreatorTool='Solid Converter PDF'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='4f107f2b-940f-486a-8f2a-28ad6f97ad51'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='98ebd5b4-5fa5-4ece-b912-99656deb05d6'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000e96b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE96B 5040 bytes
SHA-256: 0af35ab0252c6cd547d8d0fcd095a40a67ef98afec1193d89f4dbeab5dd8c89f
font_01_sfnt_off0000fa7d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFA7D 12136 bytes
SHA-256: 5f8b12c1d0be1213d7ccbf1093a340e6843870cf1905b06a12a7c2bfb0e7cea8

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