Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 00db7630a72ed184…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

17.8 KB Created: 2022-06-24 20:16:00 UTC Authoring application: LibreOffice/7.3.3.2$Linux_X86_64 LibreOffice_project/30$Build-2 15.0000
MD5: c72f714212195aaf24432560a5aa3a57 SHA-1: ee420fdd4618dc7499854467837c08e08c95cfa8 SHA-256: 00db7630a72ed1844c5c5c1c999d9ab52f099fafba7ec39e2ef3db75bb74b931
222 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.007 JavaScript T1204 User Execution

The sample leverages CVE-2017-0199 and CVE-2022-30190 vulnerabilities through an embedded OLE object. This object points to the external URL https://data-ar.com/blog/index/forum.html, which is highly suspicious and likely serves as a stage-one downloader for a secondary payload. The ClamAV detection further confirms the malicious nature of this exploit.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2022-30190 — Follina stage-1 external HTML oleObject critical CVE likely CVE_2022_30190
    External OLEObject relationship targets a remote .html with the Follina delivery shape (oleObject -> HTTP(S) HTML with trailing Moniker '!'). In live Follina samples the ms-msdt: trigger is served by the remote HTML, not the document itself.
  • OOXML OLE2Link remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 related high CVE related CVE_2017_0199_RELATED
    Document contains an o:OLEObject Type=Link whose external oleObject relationship points to a remote URL. This is the OOXML OLE2Link activation shape associated with CVE-2017-0199 delivery, but the local file does not expose URL Moniker bytes or a weaponized extension/content type, so the exact CVE cannot be proven statically.
  • ClamAV: Win.Exploit.CVE_2022_30190-9951234-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Exploit.CVE_2022_30190-9951234-1
  • External OLE object relationship high OOXML_EXTERNAL_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an oleObject relationship whose target is an external HTTP(S) URL. Office resolves this through OLE/object update paths rather than as a normal user-clicked hyperlink.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://data-ar.com/blog/index/forum.html
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
887c1b2d3dfbb943e7a3ded9508b3fe48b08c5d3d946a5cc535dd8093e2de849		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.xlsx 4350 bytes
emf_00.emf
728547181e1398f63cc712c4834a65d1c7cdf7b360b66ecab509021e5a64440e		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 536 bytes

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