Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 00d2a3b873d5f94f…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

27.6 KB First seen: 2022-12-12
MD5: 9855ccb6d5c19b045a781a9c6bdd17db SHA-1: 6b29b3cbec1616cfb60ded693bd7af55f665cca1 SHA-256: 00d2a3b873d5f94fcf8a2571cf6b9cfbf59d29c292574fce2ab7a3f58b571893
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with an Equation Editor ProgID, and uses an \objupdate directive to force activation. The document body presents a lure, instructing the user to 'Enable editing' to view the content, which is a common technique for macro-based malware droppers. The presence of these elements suggests an attempt to exploit a vulnerability, likely CVE-2017-11882, to execute a malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000047a4.bin
8c14bb790b292809c3472ed3b6d083ec9b28d9641c595131b34c1c6c26f4d4e2
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x47A4 1508 bytes