Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 00a8344451d5bbef…

MALICIOUS

PDF

38.6 KB Created: 2020-11-03 04:04:11 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-14
MD5: a59aa8504293042e943b0fbe3a8d6fcf SHA-1: 2e269cd36c74630a2b8d5951498bdf5c702e206a SHA-256: 00a8344451d5bbef7795ebc62e84ded07861a0537c0c26c36dc3abfbff68751b
184 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to disposable hosting services and known malicious redirectors. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness, and the link farm behavior suggests an attempt to lure users to malicious sites. While no scripts were extracted, the primary attack pattern involves directing users to potentially harmful external content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/123?keyword=computer+basics+worksheet In PDF document text
    • https://kuzaloxamuw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406684/potot-kuvexejoxis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zuxuzesis.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438019/mokodet_jumisimo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vezerovir.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134580053/fiximumexo_rokujebazu_pizuwikopub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jamafijuzu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437216/jijaxoz-bisimebu-befaxipixav.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jawowigo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130774982/godikiboli-takugeze.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lijipowurop.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134314174/jisegumolozu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xezujexowesujol.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134502134/7122375.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/3305/8715/files/general_and_specific_deterrence.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/6873/5140/files/manual_de_oslo_para_la_innovacin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0499/1254/5469/files/walkie_talkie_phones_boost_mobile.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0499/2735/6577/files/70512074277.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/890a880f-ff88-4ed8-8bc8-a9069ff906cb/1535564572.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0499/5468/5077/files/diffusion_and_osmosis_worksheet_2_answers.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005928.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5928 5340 bytes
SHA-256: 2d4a2c8b230cd5f3acc496b4e972b50e29d4444e4c1213ccbeff84804327b42a
font_01_sfnt_off00006b2c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6B2C 10156 bytes
SHA-256: f8cb4154aa9a8b9e0f9cc74fbab05d61583b01f68e303c8acecec774454453a3

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