Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 008855f9dd35eb3c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.5 KB Created: 2020-06-06 21:05:21 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 8e099222fcb5cecc9818cea420215cb6 SHA-1: 1ed2220f836eefb3f9009ee1aed84dbed057df80 SHA-256: 008855f9dd35eb3cfee902d79218a88a76dac8d8df3c0ec10e1bdeca71c96ef2
136 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many of which point to other PDF files hosted on various domains. This behavior is indicative of a link farm or a distribution mechanism for further malicious content. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious, supporting the observed link farm behavior.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://carolinafoodsafety.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130540714/130540714.html#philosophie+de+l%2527+%25C3%25A9ducation+grands+courants+p%25C3%25A9dagogiques
    • http://y-not.shop/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969935/pezon-modetixeba-xofukopepapam.pdf
    • http://tradepainter.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453402/5672527.pdf
    • http://golfoutingwizard.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969618/3721051.pdf
    • http://stallionpridecapitalmanagement.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130639599/keditepej.pdf
    • http://gizmoby.net/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606420/925775.pdf
    • http://235.undesirable.us/uploads/1/3/0/4/130489627/7c52cb1f6ff9.pdf
    • http://mta-sts.mail.scmnaturematters.net/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775732/xakiwagon_vuzeposune_wobogazuti.pdf
    • http://electjoedugan.org/uploads/1/3/0/3/130323249/jusizud_vatawololebi_rumeguzuzudanox.pdf
    • http://desiplatforms.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873918/c9d612833844921.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://tewopazija.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/51776717953.pdf
    • https://besolofebuna.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/tuponorawaluvinibeba.pdf
    • https://jupeveni.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/mizibunoveliveg.pdf
    • https://limapifog.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/nodukalativefotadinudiz.pdf
    • https://sabaliku.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/1046806748.pdf
    • https://xukukisogupu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/10630099406.pdf
    • https://vamuxep.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/tipolaze.pdf
    • https://tokisize.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/6462200870.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006c9b.bin
da9d0f7b4f8b049666c9654ab0fe10b2a64fdee4f6c4dbc8f7120b17a5e303ec		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6C9B 13844 bytes

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