Office (OLE) / .XLS malware analysis — malicious · 007d78635a163d6e

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

412.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-03-20

MD5: e07758cb42151c933c7fac796166b66c SHA-1: 42ccf11449836226b19de721c34d72337fae1de1 SHA-256: 007d78635a163d6eaf6b3b8964dc6ed43610841cfee6ef511f967eb33975051f

102 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The critical heuristic firing indicates the exploitation of CVE-2017-0199 via an OLE2Link object, which attempts to load a remote resource. The embedded URL, http://OASOSIDFOSWEROEROOWRWERWEREWWW0W83W338W83WOIEORIOWEIROWI3339W99ER8WE9R923R29849284WERWERWE9RW93949498WWOEIROWEOR23489W@192.3.243.151/17................17................doc, is highly suspicious and likely serves as the initial stage for downloading a secondary payload. The presence of a polyglot child PDF also suggests a multi-stage attack.

Heuristics 3

OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199

Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE

A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://OASOSIDFOSWEROEROOWRWERWEREWWW0W83W338W83WOIEORIOWEIROWI3339W99ER8WE9R923R29849284WERWERWE9RW93949498WWOEIROWEOR23489W@192.3.243.151/17................17................doc

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`stream_001_off00000960.bin` `2998a126f4fa11ceb265371a5f7968ec18bc4692a32631a544232dc74040021f`	decompressed-pdf-stream	PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x960	252488 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00011800.pdf` `b6a85b520ffd4f159c518be8fbd2e7d045d0e2330864031157587b38897753a7`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x11800	350208 bytes

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