Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0062a20998bf2848…

MALICIOUS

RTF

3.1 KB First seen: 2021-06-20
MD5: 2dc364dc66afad1a184492aaf793c5b6 SHA-1: de9eab47000eb14fe277bad394402bf428412e30 SHA-256: 0062a20998bf28484b39f0fcc5b582a549a674440abbf004c7b802149ea3e4f5
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability CVE-2017-11882. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution when the object is activated, typically through the \objupdate directive. The presence of \objdata sections and specific Equation Editor ProgIDs strongly indicates this exploit.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000b1.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB1 1319 bytes
SHA-256: 1f832e81c594a96809c97bb5256f3962eacd09ce0bc9e89fa75b07ed836b1f8e