Emotet Office (OLE) / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 00346928ca3d2c76

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

170.9 KB Created: 2020-07-27 08:46:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word

MD5: c0a8988fcb1ba9c82d94d99548e72a27 SHA-1: 28e8051b1cc18baced56d45b59fec18f7bf910cb SHA-256: 00346928ca3d2c76f4afd24e6e43ba47c5dc0a10a3b924fae243ac8a0e2d5462

262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

The file contains a critical heuristic firing for a VBA UserForm hidden-property command stager, indicating it's designed to execute code. The ClamAV detection explicitly names 'Emotet', and the presence of VBA macros with auto-execution further supports this. The script's obfuscated nature and use of string concatenation suggest it's a downloader for a secondary payload.

Heuristics 7

VBA UserForm hidden-property command stager critical OLE_VBA_USERFORM_HIDDEN_COMMAND_STAGER

VBA auto-exec macro creates a COM object from a decoded variable and reconstructs command text through Split/Join and hidden UserForm properties such as ControlTipText, Tag, Pages, or HelpContextId. This is a high-confidence macro downloader/loader shape seen in the reviewed OLE set, but it is not an Office CVE exploit primitive.
ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.EmotetIOS-9402070-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.EmotetIOS-9402070-0
Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN

Document_Open macro
CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ

CreateObject call
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC

Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains VBA macro code
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `864f6cacde0a88f42b54b79ba356ff27c52858f437376448d98011ec15c1b87a`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	3995 bytes

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