Hancitor — Office (OLE) / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0029be753622f61d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

1.18 MB Created: 2021-04-13 10:43:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: fb13d7a08e78af6060ca8cfcd436879f SHA-1: 97d2346b21edb3302aca4ff22473cb25bd7daf44 SHA-256: 0029be753622f61dd9df4f42b41350d54b130f6dc50f8e73a2547aa461dcdbf6
662 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Hancitor · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The sample is a macro-enabled Office document that contains a Document_Open macro. This macro is designed to execute a second-stage payload, identified as 'embedded_office_0008f47a.exe', which is also detected by ClamAV as Win.Dropper.Zusy. The VBA code uses ShellExecuteA to launch the embedded executable, indicating a dropper functionality. The ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-9845854-0' strongly suggests the Hancitor family.

Heuristics 17

  • Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high CVE related OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECT
    OLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is CVE-2007-3893/MS07-046-family evidence when paired with Office exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed EMF record is not proven by this rule alone.
  • OLE with Ole10Native — possible CVE-2026-21514 exploitation high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Document contains a Word OLE object with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. CVE-2026-21514 exploits OLE metadata validation; this stronger structure is treated as likely exploitation.
  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-9845854-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-9845854-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • PEB access via FS segment (x86) high SC_PEB_ACCESS
    PEB access via FS segment (x86)
  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • Reference to ShellExecute API high SC_STR_SHELLEXEC
    Reference to ShellExecute API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Reference to VirtualProtect API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALPROTECT
    Reference to VirtualProtect API
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
5bf0f47e8094b51ffb01a99f2ffef236424ace509d74209250325cebc310e282		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 5158 bytes
embedded_office_0008f47a.exe
e138f727610e0f5c1035f4d3984298c423f77f497073a679e994c23445103055		 embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x8F47A 655238 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Dropper.Zusy-9856651-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
ole10native_00.bin
aa5b2a23221da92ff134f40fbf7620167743a257b17bc9231f8ec07cb5ca1319		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1679790632/Ole10Native 598352 bytes

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