Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0018a3748eb085a6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

72.9 KB Created: 2021-06-04 09:49:12 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-27
MD5: 75e31a0bad0b6c974567754903732e84 SHA-1: e985e770a57eda63e34228f946d9a8aeb6962a55 SHA-256: 0018a3748eb085a64e4eb856bdbcc8bcf02530b1a223f8303b4507a4edc0c192
186 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF file contains a large number of external links, many pointing to disposable domains, indicating a link farm or SEO manipulation tactic. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or distributing further malware. The embedded URLs and the heuristic firings for PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM and PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM support this assessment.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://medvor.ru/pbw?utm_term=everstart+maxx+k05+user+manual PDF link annotation
    • https://pukelubaluwo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134741361/weguz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fajubelikuvevut.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134851309/c9dcadc9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://todegebonuvakef.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606144/movate.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://debefapedokofip.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134373265/2187582.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lesidodulutenem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134352412/finovof.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://melajepanaxon.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135398769/kokulaza-tomewek-mulibafafumito.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tafanoxuxirugo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135327873/dakifax_dezaj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vonuvevija.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407152/mewuxi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dugizixenopiloj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134457585/sisidonibolodob.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kisogegexene.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134374262/b7a0ff9671.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jokojizo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134509913/wuroduma.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/3d2491ce-64dd-4e0c-87b3-9f7d42ee1700/69419622542.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6262a239-fcae-4d7f-8e0a-7f25217ed766/82415208282.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/9da9d1d1-3ed6-40e7-8034-62beb7b0ecad/rush_hour_2_script.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/efdb0919-d754-41d3-baa0-0e16227cef59/rikedo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wefolevemud.pbworks.com/f/16972086082.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rukutuxeriro.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/144551580/71069451897.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wotasaful.pbworks.com/f/shatta_wale_freedom_mp3_song_download.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wikoborumun.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/144577179/84664709133.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jesababa.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/144413424/13442655968.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000df2b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDF2B 5248 bytes
SHA-256: 343b6d63b870931465fe90ceba2acc35ef9afb21b8c92c32ff449d9e892a6696
font_01_sfnt_off0000f0f9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF0F9 11136 bytes
SHA-256: e98c4defc21222db9cebed38ebe934f8923f8dad70c1e907d8f174bc6af29bc5

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