Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0013c00a17389f12…

MALICIOUS

PDF

80.3 KB Created: 2021-09-04 20:50:30 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-12
MD5: 9d473085408e282c978822d810f42fd1 SHA-1: 67c64677d9a17a71b3e3f496e2a7ae65ceb39794 SHA-256: 0013c00a17389f1279a4b4af764ce5402db4a2536f7bb351c2bc0146e47ac933
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a PDF document that contains embedded JavaScript and multiple external URIs, many of which point to compromised websites or link farms. The heuristic 'SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE' indicates the document likely attempts to trick the user into installing a browser extension or update. The embedded JavaScript and external links suggest a mechanism for downloading and executing a second-stage payload or redirecting the user to a malicious site.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9968

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://pixomot.ru/uplcv?utm_term=firefox+extension+convert+to+pdf PDF link annotation
    • http://maxitelt.no/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1612aa09d6a480---80085141504.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://grdr.org/paidel/ckfinder/userfiles/files/24792515602.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nceed.kr/pds/userfiles/files/mumefiledokiwi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tivati.com/uploads/userfiles/file/bijinizedagijugavubonif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uaqbakery.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608320ed8a4d5---koferukid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.peplex.it/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606cc6e4eadce---64522983908.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ameshamagazine.com/js/upload/files/lejiwubelozitugobisifupa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://waukeganeast1980.com/clients/877304/File/48455648514.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://yuha.be/_files/file/wavifujalupufaturuwugefop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.espace-hotelier.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/1283332853.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://goodtraefarm.com/ckupload/files/kebutidexutorekigerevuxox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://eko-baby.ru/userfiles/file/solizib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mandalaconfeccao.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608053bca57cf---sinelamuwakesim.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mpti.ru/userfiles/file/19753328255.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ecbpolska.pl/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b252f179fc34368d974d9216ad2ac668/380739000.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mb-classic-service.de/userfiles/file/56892486563.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://plewmal-d.com/Uploads/files/dexiziderebuxokok.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://agentcctv.com/userfiles/file/zalanivebamud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://yilip.net/userData/board/file/85594186271.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://evocative.ru/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16078bf8f2c68b---womudamonomasuvekijamawo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://misionesmedellin2030.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/u01dgja5m1ji7fm7cm4emeb2b8/tigodojenivom.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vegas-shop.net/uploads/files/temakuvotijibabez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d98a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD98A 16236 bytes
SHA-256: 774317552c2ac0d1d6bc227cf03742fb7ee7929a76d0b82f1292dc8091ca6ad8
font_01_sfnt_off0001037d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1037D 10552 bytes
SHA-256: e3ddbc6f1bf78077c7b5bdf1e7698e3c0b5db254b5b45fd86c501c2529d232f7
font_02_sfnt_off00011bb3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11BB3 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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