Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0011117c2455b8e8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

84.8 KB Created: 2021-06-29 02:14:58 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 861046a704fd519e19a34b44107d1930 SHA-1: c4feaffd7c50922b495dd0766facb7ea97bac715 SHA-256: 0011117c2455b8e8e8e1bffca9cc778458906446baaa3c56c0b1561bfb27c8d0
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and numerous external links, many pointing to compromised CMS upload directories or disposable hosting, suggesting a link farm designed to host malicious content. The 'SE_CALLBACK_LURE' heuristic indicates the document likely prompts the user to call a phone number, a common tactic in phishing and tech-support scams. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9951

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://client-sms.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/wirubeg.pdf
    • https://altonika.pro/files/fck/file/46424833976.pdf
    • https://www.hagensmarketing.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bf9f49824b0---71312464461.pdf
    • https://www.andeanskyline.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160710eebb4657---36091466018.pdf
    • https://414movement.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/556ede012140b2e6219f745ed6d65446/getotoporilevizemolexufaw.pdf
    • http://fitviewer.biz/files/file/damufomafifilaxafuziko.pdf
    • https://www.allterra.group/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/04af673baf81e62c4e64b26744678ce2/34124246511.pdf
    • https://brandonsmilesdentistry.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/h2hrbc1mvr12g9on2dn4fulf36/14220443115.pdf
    • http://socialbomjesus.org.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160817a696e824---xefumadumuza.pdf
    • https://www.espymetcalf.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160aa79999e2a1---66695568815.pdf
    • https://askopenko.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a02b86c4c1a7459f3547755a833d7601/ledak.pdf
    • https://www.growxponential.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/qgfrpfq4car1h9qu56lkkbvn8i/momigutov.pdf
    • http://angeladaniel.eu/uploads/files/zepesozekefe.pdf
    • https://dsodrecital.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a728bd08be7---fepaz.pdf
    • https://postscriptproductions.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c8f5db7051a---15159392180.pdf
    • http://candientuvibra.com/images/file/33440658136.pdf
    • http://csc0851.com/userfiles/file/20210615203449_b2fbof.pdf
    • https://agentcctv.com/userfiles/file/23897683240.pdf
    • http://grandchainfamilyfoundation.org/clients/85333/File/dufedabibixi.pdf
    • http://vilaportugal.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608da27b797e7---zisele.pdf
    • https://relaxationplusmn.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5c90bb2bd0afd0f68b9c71d59ee13fa7/56314018434.pdf
    • https://www.phoenixdentalacademy.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a43c1e8149a81d8873bbb67925bde419/lazamadilunetibupuwigak.pdf
    • https://www.andimoda.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9bad835a0e87f496887e191b31142bdd/kezidenujipi.pdf
    • http://praguetransfer.com/files/file/94897401097.pdf
    • http://alexhofford.com/temp/files/file/16627358056.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/BkSY9tpko7c/uplcv?utm_term=can+someone+see+a+screenshot+on+instagram+post
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e81b.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE81B 16792 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00010032.bin
56bdd48125bc675883518cd351a5a02cdf6d0bc61366484b7d6642f133bd6b08
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10032 10808 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000118f2.bin
8d2bf7dec1d39534c7f365105ec8ce45cdc8f4400120002b496372351a7b890f
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x118F2 17056 bytes