Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0008e61beb8c8400…

MALICIOUS

RTF

5.6 KB Authoring application: Msftedit 5.41.21.2510 First seen: 2020-05-25
MD5: 27f352f3e19f511fd53cd8212265b47a SHA-1: 34a32b9f2af9eca4ae66f20007d3a0cb0c8435c5 SHA-256: 0008e61beb8c840058710d24e1758e1e938d8435d8b7c0d4a683d3c317a2f057
222 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an OLE object that is automatically activated and forces an update, triggering CVE-2017-0199 or CVE-2017-8759. This exploit is designed to load a remote object, likely to download and execute a second-stage payload from the embedded URL the embedded link The ClamAV signature further confirms the exploit's nature.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-0199 / CVE-2017-8759 (OLE2Link auto-activated remote loader) critical CVE related RTF_OLE2LINK_REMOTE_MONIKER_LOADER
    RTF embeds an OLE2Link object that is force-activated with \objupdate (no user interaction on open) and fetches a remote second stage — through an INCLUDETEXT/INCLUDEPICTURE field or the OLE object's own moniker. This is the OLE2Link auto-update attack path shared by CVE-2017-0199 (server returns an HTA/scriptlet) and CVE-2017-8759 (server returns a SOAP WSDL the .NET parser compiles). Office processes the fetched response through the same code path; the specific CVE depends on the now-unreachable server content type.
  • ClamAV: Rtf.Exploit.CVE_2017_0199-6335035-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Rtf.Exploit.CVE_2017_0199-6335035-0
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://192.168.178.157:8080// In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000104.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x104 2724 bytes
SHA-256: 41fdfa60443587e6207880ec9a0fee2ac4cd080fbc30d285e5898c0db72a1208

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